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Oklahoma Constitutional Law: Highway Robbery: In re
Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority: The Eulogy
for Oklahoma Constitutional Debt Limitations
The practice, therefore, of contracting debt will almost infallibly be
abuse4 in every government.1
David Hume
English Political Philosopher
1711-1776
-

Introduction
On March 20, 1998, Taps sounded across the Oklahoma plains memorializing the
demise of state constitutional debt limitations. The death was neither quick nor
painless. Conceived in the naive hope of governmental fiscal responsibility,
constitutional debt limitations were borne with legalistic defects and loopholes. Debt
limits led a tortuous life as the legislature continually circumvented the limitations
and stole the very breath from their bosom by creating exceptions, special funds,
and the concept of self-liquidating debt.
The Oklahoma judicial system, whose job it is "to say what the law [and the
constitution] is,"' did not save the constitutional provision from a palliative
existence. Instead, it joined the Oklahoma legislature in damaging the debt limits
even further by judicially approving the techniques of circumvention. Although for
some time the Oklahoma Supreme Court prolonged the life of debt limits with an
occasional supportive decision, it rendered the fatal blow in a marginal 5-4 decision
in the case of In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority?
In that case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court was asked to decide whether highway
improvement bonds, authorized by title 73, section 168.6 of the Oklahoma Statutes,'
created a prohibited debt within the meaning of the Oklahoma constitutional debt
limitations! Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the statute was
constitutional, the judgment had far wider ramifications The decision gave the
Oklahoma legislature free reign to create future state debts serviced solely through

1. DAVID HUME, WRITINGS ON ECONOMICS 92 (Eugene Rotwein ed., Univ. of Wis. Press 1955).
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

3. 958 P.2d 759 (Okla. 1998).
4. See 73 OKLA. STAT. § 168.6 (2000).
5. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
6. See Editorial, Good Call, TULSA WORM, Mar. 24, 1998, at 8, available in 1998 WL 11130220
(explaining that the length of time the case was before the high court, the slim majority ruling, and the
lengthy dissents show that the justices agonized over the decision, which had extensive constitutional

ramifications).
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diversions of legislative appropriations from the general revenues of the state while
circumventing the vote of the populace.7

In authorizing this legislative fiscal

strategy, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rendered constitutional debt limitations
meaningless.

This note focuses on the unique problems of constitutional debt limitations
through revenue bond financing in four parts. First, the note gives a brief
explanation of the evolution of constitutional debt limitations and the law prior to
In re Oklahoma CapitolImprovement Authority. Second, the note introduces the
facts of In re Oklahoma Capitol ImprovementAuthority and presents an analysis of
the Oklahoma Supreme Court's opinion. Third, the note discusses the impact of this
decision on Oklahoma constitutional law. Fourth, the note concludes with a
discussion of the significance of Oklahoma CapitolImprovement Authority and the
current state of debt limitations.
I. Law Priorto Oklahoma CapitolImprovement Authority
A. History and Key Aspects to ConstitutionalDebt Limitations
The concept of constitutional debt'limitations is best understood from a historical
perspective. With the industrial revolution, Civil War, and continued westward
expansion of the Nineteenth Century came an increased need for transportation,
primarily by canal and railroads." These critical modes of transit became imperative
to expand trade, wage war, and extend society to the west coast. Most state
legislatures borrowed recklessly to finance these capital construction projects." Debt
limitations were enacted to curtail reckless borrowing and balance fiscal responsibility with the need for creating and improving modes of transportation. Despite
the passage of time, this remains the crux of the issue today'
Before constitutional debt limitations, states began falling deeper into debt,
defaulting on loans and facing widespread chaos and financial debacles."
Eventually, voters moved to curtail future problems by amending their state
constitutions to include maximums for aggregate state debt, restrictions rigidly
setting the limit of official discretion, and in some cases, outright bans on state
debt.'" As new states joined the Union, they included debt limitations in their

7. See Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d at 761.
8. See id.
9. See id; see also Comment, State Aid to IndustrialDevelopment and the "Credit Clause," 28
MD. L. REv. 411,415-16 n.30 (1968) (discussing the governmental carelessness in contracting debt for
capital improvement projects).
10. See Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The
Effectiveness of ConstitutionalDebt Limitations, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1301, 1306 (1991) (discussing the
origins and history of constitutional debt limitation and its relationship with transportation).
11. See Charles W. Goldner, Jr., State and Local Government FiscalResponsibility: An Integrated
Approach, 26 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 925, 927-29 (1991) (discussing the fiscal upheaval created by the
defaulting state governments).
12. See id. at 926; see also Robert H. Bowmar, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 IowA
L. REV. 863, 867 (1967) (discussing the voters' inability to accept flexible debt provisions); Sterk &
Goldman, supra note 10, at 1315-16.
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constitutions to avoid the financial embarrassment of their predecessors. 3
Unwilling to finance their futures on unreliable credit, the states began to restrict

themselves to limited industrial progress in order to maintain stable state
economies. 4 Thus, most states in the Union created their debt limits in reaction

to the adverse financial repercussions caused by their zealous attempt to profit by
westward expansion and the industrial revolution.

However, Oklahoma's constitutional debt limitations had an entirely different

origin.' 5 Having joined the Union in 1907, Oklahoma managed to bypass the
impact and repercussions of the industrial revolution. 6 Nevertheless, the "Sooner
State" experienced a specific set of circumstances that led directly to public aversion

to the legislature's unlimited power to create debt. 17 Hit especially hard by the
Great Depression, Oklahoma's government officials attempted to deficit-spend their
way out of the economic morass of unemployment, business failures, and bank
foreclosures of farmland. The legislature of 1937, dominated by the Democratic

Party, passed bills appropriating millions for relief and reform. 9 Tax revenue,
however, was not provided to finance the increased spending, leaving the state with

massive debt.'
Following the lead of President Roosevelt, Governor Ernest "E.W." Marland
proposed a comprehensive agenda that amounted to a "Little New Deal" for

Oklahoma."' The Oklahoma legislature ignored the Governor's recommendations,
and instead "launched an orgy of spending that earned their session the title of the
'spending sixteenth' legislature."' Unlike the Governor, the legislature's sole

purpose was to bolster its own political power by "record, budget-shattering

13. See C. Robert Morris, Jr., Evading Debt Limitations With Public Building Authorities: The
Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE LJ. 234, 241 (1958-59) (discussing the practice of
new states learning lessons from their predecessors and creating constitutional debt limitations upon
entering statehood).
I
14. See generally 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Securities and Obligations § 42 (1972) (explaining that
the constitutions of numerous states have made express provision to the effect that the state shall not
create any debt or liability, except for certain delineated purposes, and only in monetarily limited form).
15. Note that the uniqueness of Oklahoma started with its birth through the Oklahoma land runs and
continued throughout much of its history, to include the reasons for adopting Constitutional debt
limitations. See generally JAMES SCALES & DANNEY GOBLE, OKLAHOMA POLITcs: A HISTORY 3-40
(1982).
16. See generally JAY J. WAGONER, OKLAHOMA! 138-39 (1987) (explaining the time and

circumstances of Oklahoma's statehood).
17. See W. DAVID BAIRD & DANNEY GOBLE, THE STORY OF OKLAHOMA 297-98 (1994) (explaining
the story of the Oklahoma land runs and how Oklahoma earned its nickname the "Sooner State").
18. See ODIE B. FAULK, OKLAHOMA: LAND OF THE FAIR GOD 168 (1986) (explaining the

legislature's method for solving the problems created by the Depression).
19. See id
20. See id.
21. OKLAHOMA: NEW VrEws OF THE 46TH STATE 157 (Anne Hodges Morgan & H. Wayne Morgan

eds., 1982) (explaining Governor Marland's economic recovery plan for Oklahoma).
22. Id
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appropriations."' The immediate consequence of this excessive spending was near
bankruptcy for the State. '
In 1939, Governor Leon C. Phillips led the passage of the balanced budget
amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution.' The amendment forbade the state
government from appropriating funds in excess of its revenues. Although
amended several times, the legacy of Governor Phillips remains in the constitution
and is a testament to the people's war against runaway government spending.2
Thus, Oklahoma and other states created debt limitations to address the state
legislatures' inability or unwillingness to maintain fiscal responsibility and account
for the future consequences of their actions.' Inevitably, the dichotomy between
the public's need for capital developments and the "statutorily articulated aversion"
toward state debt created conflict.O The outcome of this struggle was the
legislatures' systematic development of a variety of escape devices and technical
distinctions that permitted them to avoid the constitutional debt limitations." These
legal loopholes continued to evolve over the years, until the public viewed their
existence as proper and needed.
Some of the escape devices can be classified as the creation of "public
authorities," "special fund" financing, and leasing arrangements?' Each legislatively created escape mechanism allowed the characterization of borrowing for
certain public projects as outside the scope of the constitutional debt prohibitions."
Ironically, the state legislatures who created debt limits were able to emasculate
their own rules through legalistic subterfuge."
Through narrow judicial interpretation of constitutional debt and selective judicial
enforcement of debt prohibition clauses, state courts have also embraced the
calculated circumvention of constitutional debt limits and have made it their modus
operandi. Restrictive judicial interpretation of what constitutes indebtedness has

23. Id.
24. See id.; see also SCALES & GOBLE, supranote 15, at 179-201.
25. See W. DAvID BAIRD & DANNEY GOBLE, THE STORY OF OKLAHOMA 400 (1994) (describing

the passage of the balanced budget amendment).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Sterk & Goldman, supranote 10, at 1323-24; see also C. Dickerman Williams & Peter R.
Nehemids, MunicipalImprovements as Affected by ConstitutionalDebt Limitations, 37 COLUM. L. REv.
177, 177-84 (1937) (discussing the purpose of debt limitation provisions).
29. Comment, The JudicialDemise of State ConstitutionalDebt Limitations,56 IOwA L. REv. 646,
648 (1970-71) (discussing the opposing desires of prohibiting long-term debt and advancing capital
improvements).
30. See U
31. See Sterk & Goldman, supra note 10, at 1330 (explaining and listing constitutional debt
limitation escape devices).
32. See iii
33. See generally A. JAMES HEiNS, CONsTnroNAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST STATE DEBT at vii,
27 (1963) (concluding that state legislatures are generally able to circumvent constitutional debt
restrictions).
34. See Goldner, supra note 11, at 935-36.
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created a significant number of non-voter-approved state obligations.35 Judicial
interpretation changes over time and is shaped by changing mores, personalities, and

politics. Additionally, state judges are not shielded from political influence, and thus
are subject to the same demands that influence legislative decision making.'
Because of the Oklahoma Supreme Court justices' appointment and retention
process, it is naive to believe that the court is able to completely avoid the influence
of political considerations.' As in most bond issue cases in the past, the "affected
governmental unit's needs were made known to the bench" before it handed down
the decision!' Even the case of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority was not

immune from political sway.39 As a result of this influence, the justices used
strained arguments to disregard clear constitutional mandates in order to meet the

political and economic needs of the state. Although the court's decision may not
have been improperly influenced, the governor's unrelenting powerful presence
created an aura of impropriety.

In the past, the most common way public authorities imaginatively evaded
constitutional limitations on debt was to issue revenue bonds, which are bonds
backed by the revenue flow created by the project instead of the state's taxing

power.n '

The primary reason for issuing these non-guaranteed bonds was to

"circumvent constitutional limitations on guaranteed debt.""' Courts found that

constitutional debt limitations would not apply to obligations for which taxpayers
were indirectly liable.!2 Therefore, it became commonplace for state governments
to finance capital improvement projects with repayment of the debt from revenues
generated by the projects. However, problems arose when the users of the financed

project were government agencies, whose only source of revenue was from general

35. See id. at 929.
36. See Sterk & Goldman, supra note 10, at 1358.
37. See id. at 1359.
38. Bowmar, supra note 12, at 890.
39. See Paul English, State Road Bonds Face Summer Traffic Jam, Adviser Says, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), Feb. 27, 1998, at A3 (stating that the Governor indicated that he had
spoken to justices about the bond issue and stressed the importance of the program to them); John
Greiner, DividedCourt Upholds State RoadBonds,DAiLY OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), Mar. 21,1998,
at Al (quoting Governor Keating as stating before appeals were filed, "[an adverse ruling would have
been calamitous"); Marie Price, PairDefends Highway Bond Issue, J. REC. (Oklahoma City), Oct. 6,
1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 14397385 (stating that Governor Keating and the legislature
overwhelmingly supported the legislation); Memorandum from Governor Keating to Chief Justice Kauger
(Mar. 23, 1998) (on file at the Oklahoma Supreme Court) (stating that the Governor is grateful to the
Supreme Court for the approval of the bond issue (before the rehearing)); see also Edwin Kessler, Bonds
Set Scary Precedent, DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), Jan. 2, 1999, at A4 (noting that the

congratulatory letter from Governor Keating to Chief Justice Kauger was sent before appeals were filed).
40. See D. Roderick Kiewiet & Kristin Szakaly, Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An
Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness, 12 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 62, 69 (1996) (explaining the concept of
revenue bonds and their functions). See generally James Mullen, Municipal Corporations: Validity of
Revenue Bond Financingin Oklahoma, 2 OKLA. L. Rv. 522, 523 (1949).
41. Kiewiet & Szakaly, supra note 40, at 69.
42. See id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:319

revenue collected from taxpayers. It was not long before these types of
complications extended to Oklahoma.
B. Oklahoma Law Priorto Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority
Oklahoma's constitutional debt limitation law has evolved considerably since
statehood. Like most states, Oklahoma adopted not only exceptions to debt
limitations but also exceptions to balanced budget amendments for the goal of
achieving sound state fiscal policy.43 Even though the people reserved all power
to determine whether or not debt should be incurred, the Oklahoma legislature, like
other state courts, eventually created a plethora of escape devices in order to avoid
the rules that legislatures had previously promulgated As one commentator has
noted, "[these] techniques for creating synthetic debt, instruments that look and act
like debt but are made up of components that are formally treated as something else,
have become sophisticated in recent years." '
1. Special Fund & Self-liquidating Debt
In the seminal case Baker v. Carter,;' the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized
the "special fund doctrine" and self-liquidating debt.47 In Baker, a statute
authorized a public corporation - the Agricultural and Mechanical College of the
State of Oklahoma' 8 - to issue certificates of indebtedness to build dormitories
with payment from revenues produced from the future rental of the dormitories.49
The revenues creating the special fund did not exist prior to the issuance of the
obligations; instead, they arose wholly out of the property created by the authorized
bonds." The special fund was not derived from a tax or an existing incomeproducing property.' Because this process did not affect the state's public
revenues, the project was said to be self-liquidating. 2
The court held that if particular bonds or obligations were secured by and payable
only from the revenues to be realized from the property acquired or constructed
from the proceeds of the bonds, they do not constitute debts of the state within the
constitutional provisions.' The general taxpayers were insulated from the financial
obligation since only the users of the project paid for the construction or

43. See OKLA. CONST. art. X, §§ 23-25; see also 62 OKLA. STAT. § 41.34 (1991) (displaying the
exceptions to debt limitations and balanced budget amendments).
44. See Sterk & Goldman, supra note 10, at 1329-30.
45. Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That Does What It Is
Supposed To Do (And No More), 106 YALE LJ.1449, 1490 (1997) (discussing the methods of avoiding
constitutional debt limitations).
46. 25 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1933).
47. Id. at 758.
48. The Agricultural and Mechanical College is now known as Oklahoma State University. See 70
OKLA. STAT. § 3401 (1991).
49. See Baker, 25 P.2d at 748.
50. See id, at 754.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 755.
53. See id.
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improvement. Consequently, constitutional debt limitations need not apply unless
the debt is imposed on the populace as a whole.
The court identified two scenarios in which it would find a violation of
constitutional debt limitations. First, a violation would exist if the indebtedness
created a liability whereby the state or agency may suffer a loss if the special fund
was insufficient to pay the obligation incurred.' Second, a violation would exist
if the state was compelled to feed the special fund from other revenues in addition
to those arising from the special improvement contemplated." Further, in the
second scenario, the court found that "[s]uch a subterfuge, if sanctioned would go
far to effectually wipe out the purpose and intent of the constitutional provision."'
2. "Restricted"Special Fund Doctrine
The Oklahoma Supreme Court refined and limited the scope of the selfliquidation doctrine in Boswell v. State? The Boswell court held that a multi-year
obligation for a capital improvement project, which is to be repaid from a special
fund, is self-liquidating only if the money for repayment is generated solely from
the project and not from state revenues that could be distributed to another public
function. 8 The court limited the special fund doctrine by differentiating between
a "special fund" and the "special fund doctrine." The court defined a "special
fund" as a "particular fund derived from a specific tax levied for a specific
purpose"; whereas, the "special fund doctrine" describes "a fund partaking of the
nature of a trust fund derivable from a self-liquidating project."' Moreover, the
Boswell court rejected the "expanded special fund doctrine," which applies to
obligations that are repaid from the future net income attributable to improvements
to an existing property and that provide for the extension or improvement of only
state property.6t In other words, the Boswell court found that self-liquidating debt
cannot be applied to an expansion or enhancement of state property, even if the
property was originally created by the use of general taxation.
Boswell involved facts very similar to those in the Oklahoma Capital
ImprovementAuthority. In Boswell, the State Highway Commission sought approval
of a statutorily authorized bond issue for construction and repair of state highways
and bridges to be retired by an excise tax on motor fuel.' Although the Act

54. See id. at 757.
55. See U; see also Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 28, at 198 ("Consistent with the premise that
the special fund contract, in order not to constitute debt, must provide immunity for the taxpayer is the

rule that the special fund may not be 'fed' from taxes or the proceeds of taxation.").
56. Baker, 25 P.2d at 757.
57. 74 P.2d 940 (Okla. 1937).
58. See id. at 949.
59. Md at 946.

60. Id. at 950.
61. See id at 947-48 (explaining that the "expanded special fund doctrine" applies to obligations
that provide for the extension or improvement of state property, and that those obligations are payable
out of the future net income of the property as improved).
62. See id at 941-42 (explaining that motor vehicle registration and license tax revenue was to be
diverted into a special fund pledged for payment of the highway revenue anticipation notes).
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declared that the revenue anticipation notes (in the sum of $35 million) were not to
be considered debts or general obligations of the state, the Boswell court recognized
that such declaration was not dispositive of the cause.' Also, the court held that
one legislative assembly could not guarantee the lifespan of its legislation relating
to the fiscal affairs of the state beyond the period" of its biennium.'
The court rejected the proposed bond issue because the highway improvement
project was not self-liquidating. More specifically, the special fund was not created
from taxes that constituted a part of the state's general revenue otherwise devoted
to a legitimate public use.' Hence, the fund created by the imposition of motor
fuel taxes was not a "special fund" within the meaning of the special fund doctrine
and violated the state's constitutional debt limitations. 67
3. ClarifyingSelf-liquidating Debt
In 1954, the Oklahoma Supreme Court further limited the concept of selfliquidating debt. In In re Oklahoma Educational Television Authority the court'
held that it is a violation of constitutional debt provisions to authorize a bond issue
to be repaid out of revenues accruing to an already existing fund for the sole
purpose of retiring such bonds.'
In that case, the Oklahoma Educational Television Authority requested approval
of a revenue bond issue, to be paid for with money from the Oklahoma Public
Building Fund for the construction and operation of public television facilities.7"
Although the fund was not a state tax revenue fund, it served purposes that if not
supported by the state fund, would have to be paid for with tax money!' The
bonded debt was not self-liquidating because it was made against a permanent state
fund and future revenues.
4. Lease Revenue
Six years later, in In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority," the court
held that a statutorily authorized bond issue that was to be repaid solely from the

63.
64.
now an
65.

See id. at 943.
Note that the period of Oklahoma's biennium, the period for which appropriations are made, is
annual session, as opposed to the two-year period that existed when the court made its holding.
See Boswell, 74 P.2d at 947.

66. See id. at 949.
67. See id. at 946.
68. 272 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1954).
69. See id. at 1035; accordIn re Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 221 P.2d 795, 804 (Okla. 1950); In re
Oklahoma Planning & Resources Bd., 203 P.2d 415,417 (Okla. 1949); In re Board of Regents for Okla.
Agric. & Mechanical Colleges, 167 P.2d 883, 883-84 (Okla. 1946); State ex rel Kerr v. Grand River
Darn Auth., 154 P.2d 946, 949 (Okla. 1945); In re Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 161 P.2d 447,
448 (Okla. 1945); Sheldon v. Grand River Dan Auth., 76 P.2d 355, 361-62 (Okla. 1938). Each of these

cases offer examples of court-approved self-liquidating bond issues in Oklahoma.
70. See Oklahoma Educ. Television Auth., 272 P.2d at 1028-29.
71. See id. at 1033.
72. See id
73. 355 P.2d 1028 (Okla. 1960).
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rents and revenues of buildings to be erected, did not constitute a violative state
debt.!4 The court found the bonds for state office buildings were self-liquidating
because the legislature appropriated to the tenant state agencies sufficient funds to
pay the rent that would amortize the bonds 5 Further, the court noted that any
contract to pay money in the future creates a debt, but contracts payable in
installments, if the consideration is also provided in the future, do not violate the
constitutional debt provisions 6
The court found that use of state funds to pay the rent was a proper expenditure. 7 The court found no difference between a state agency paying rent through
a lease agreement to a private party or to the Authority.78 Furthermore, the court
found that a multi-year lease agreement did not bind subsequent legislatures to make
appropriations to pay the rental of state departments occupying space in the
buildings, because consideration that the payor is to receive in return for such
payments will be provided in the future.7
IlL. In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority
A. Background of the Case
Pursuant to title 73, section 160 of the Oklahoma Statutes,' the Oklahoma
Capitol Improvement Authority (OCIA) brought an action to determine the
constitutional validity of title- 73, section 168.6 of the Oklahoma Statutes,"'
authorizing a highway improvement bond issue for the purpose of building and
improving Oklahoma's transportation system.' The OCIA brought the case before
the Oklahoma Supreme Court to prevent future parties from challenging the same
issue in other courts and potentially delaying issuance of the bonds and commencement of the program.'
74. See id.at 1032-33.
75. See id.
76. See d.
at 1031.
77. See id.
at 1032.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 1033.
80. See 73 OKLA. STAT. § 160 (1991). The statute provides in pertinent part that "[tihe Authority
is authorized, in its discretion, to file an application with the Supreme Court of Oklahoma for the
approval of any bonds to be issued hereunder, and exclusive original jurisdiction is hereby conferred
upon the Supreme Court to hear and determine each such application." Id.
81. See 73 OKLA. STAT. § 168.6(A) (Supp. 1997). The statute provides in pertinent part that
[t]he Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority is hereby authorized to issue bonds or
other negotiable instruments or evidences of indebtedness in the principal amount
sufficient to generate Three Hundred Million Dollars. ($300,000,000.00) in proceeds
available to fund the construction and improvement of the highway system in this state
as set forth in this act.

lId.
82. See Bill May, A Busy Week, J. REc. (Oklahoma City), Aug. 19, 1997, at 5 (explaining that the
statute is in coalition with House Bill 1629, passed in the waning days of the 1997 legislative session;
House Bill 1629 provided a mixture of general appropriation funds and bond sales to finance highway
construction over the next five years). "
83. See Brian Ford, Road ConstructionBond Issue Gains, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 24, 1997, at A8
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Although constitutional fiscal responsibility has survived in Oklahoma since
statehood, the state provided a balanced budget amendment on March 11, 1941,

requiring state-issued bonds to be backed by a dedicated revenue stream.'
According to the balanced budget amendment, bonds not approved by the voters and

not backed by a dedicated revenue stream violate the constitutional prohibition of
state debt. Consequently, Edwin Kessler, head of the public advocacy group
"Common Cause of Oklahoma, " M led the uphill battleP in court to oppose the
OCIA in regard to the bond issue.'
Originally, the mission of the OCIA was to act as a funding source for

construction of state agency offices by acquiring, equipping, contracting, and
operating buildings.'

To help the OCIA accomplish its mission, the legislature

gave the OCIA authority to issue revenue bonds specifically for the construction and
equipping of these office buildings and other state facilities." In 1996, the
Oklahoma legislature statutorily broadened the purpose, authority, and powers of the
OCIA to include the construction, repair, and maintenance of state highway
infrastructure.9 The amendment provided for certain agreements between the
OCIA and the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) for issuing

evidence of indebtedness or bonds in certain amounts for certain purposes. In the
current case, legislative leaders wanted the proposed bond issue for new state

(explaining motives for bringing the case to the Oklahoma Supreme Court).
84. See OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 23; see also In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d
759, 789 (Okla. 1998) (discussing the purpose of the amendment).
85. See OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 23.
86. See generally C.T. Foster, Annotation, Presumptionsand Burden of Proofas to Violation of or
Compliance with PublicDebt Limitation, 16 A.L.R.2D 515,557 (1951) ("Charges that a proposed public
expenditure or bond issue... will be or is invalid because violative of the debt limitation imposed by
constitution... are frequently met with in [sic] actions brought by taxpayers to restrain the public body
").
from incurring a proposed obligation ....
87. See id.at 523 (explaining that the majority rule is that the party opposing a public obligation
has the burden of proving that such obligation violates the applicable debt limitation provision of the
law).
88. See Brendan Coffey, Oklahoma Readies $300 Million Bonds With No Real Backing, CAPITAL
MARKETS REP., Apr. 14, 1998 (discussing the fight against the bond issue); see also Tim Talley, Citizens
Group Asks High Court To Review OK of Bond Sale, DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), Apr. 9,
1998, at 5.
89. See 73 OKLA. STAT. § 152(A) (Supp. 1997) (explaining that the OCIA was designed to develop
and improve the Oklahoma capitol area, hence the name); see also Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth.
(visited Aug. 1, 2000) <http.//www.oklaosf.state.ok.us/osfdocs/budgetlbb96-105.html> (providing general
information on the OCIA, financial obligations, and missions).
90. See 73 OKLA. STAT. § 152(A); see also John Greiner, FirstSteps Taken On Road Bond Issue,
DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), Aug. 23, 1997, at 6 (listing the membership of the OCIA).
91. See 73 OKLA. STAT. § 161(6) (Supp. 1997). The statute provides in pertinent part that
[tio
make and enter into contracts and agreements with the departments and agencies of
the State of Oklahoma and/or federal government relating to the rent, amortization of cost
and-use of the building by such departments and agencies, or relating to the construction,
improvement, repair, and maintenance of the highway infrastructure in this state ....
92. See id.
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highways to pass through the OCIA rather than the Turnpike Authority to avoid any
chance of the new highways becoming toll roads.' This procedure of avoiding the
Turnpike Authority was a major departure from former legislative actions.'
Regardless of which governmental authority controlled the bond issue, the financing
concerns remained the same.
The MBIA Insurance Corporation (MBIA) insured the bonds, which already had
high credit ratings.' The ratings reflected Oklahoma's payment history on leaserevenue bonds, the weaker security that is contingent on annual legislative
appropriation, and the state's credit standing. OCIA sold the bonds through
negotiation to an underwriting team headed by Salomon Smith Barney and secured
the bonds by monthly "lease" payments made by the ODOT to the OCIA.' The
OCIA-issued bonds were to be retired over a period of ten years from legislatively
appropriated funds paid from the ODOT under a leasing agreement to the OCIA.
The appropriated funding was to be derived from several sources including: prepaid
user fees; direct taxes; Rainy Day Funds9 earmarked for the State Transportation
Fund; and general revenues collected for the State Highway Construction and
Maintenance Fund."m In addition, the OCIA promised to pay the interest payments
on the debt on a semiannual basis from these same funds. 1,

93. See Chuck Ervin, U.S. 75 Due FirstWork in Program,TULSA WORLD, July 3, 1997, at All;
Marie Price, List of Projects Due for Highway Plan, J. REC. (Oklahoma City), May 15, 1997, at 3
(discussing the fear of legislative leaders that the issuing agency would be the Oklahoma Turnpike
Authority).
94. See Bill May, Keating Gives "Pep Talk" on Highway Construction Program, J. REC.
(Oklahoma City), June 3, 1997, at 6 (stating that using the OCIA for highway improvement was a
significant deviation from standard operating procedures).
95. See Munis Up 1/8; Latest Supply Torrent Seen at $2.5 Billion, CAPITAL MARKETS REP., July
8, 1998 (explaining that the bonds have ratings of single-A2 from Moody's and single-A-plus from
Standard & Poor); see also Official Statement of the Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, State
Highway Capital Improvement Revenue Bonds, Series 1998, at 23 [hereinafter Official Statement].
96. See Oklahoma Capitol Imp. Auth. / Moody's - 2: Cash Balances Cited, CAPITAL MARKETS
REP., July 2, 1998.
97. See Paul English, State Road Bonds Face Summer Traffic Jam, Adviser Says, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), Feb. 27, 1998, at 3; Edwin Kessler, State Road Plan Raises Questions,
TULSA WORLD, June 7, 1998, at 62 (explaining that the bond underwriting firm was selected noncompetitively); see also Official Statement, supra note 95.
98. See Brian Ford & Chuck Ervin, House EasilyPasses $1Billion RoadBill, TULSA WORLD, May
30, 1997, at A3 (explaining that House members compromised by agreeing to use the state's
Constitutional Reserves "Rainy-Day" Fund to help pay for the plan).
99. See 69 OKLA. STAT. § 1501.1(A) (1991). The statute states in pertinent part that "[tlhe fund
shall be subject to legislative appropriation and shall consist of revenues apportioned to such fund by
provisions of the Oklahoma Statutes imposing taxes upon various motor fuels and of such other revenues
as may be provided by law." Id.
100. See 69 OKLA. STAT. § 1501(a) (1991). The statute states in pertinent part that the fund consists
of "[a]ll monies received by taxation or otherwise for use on the state highways of this state." Id.
101. See Official Statement, supra note 95, at 5; see also Committee Approves Sales of Bonds to
Help Fund Construction, PrisonBeds, J. REC. (Oklahoma City), SepL 2, 1997, at 3 (explaining that a
member of the legislative oversight committee noted that the latest projection is that less than $50 million
will be paid in interest and fees); Oklahoma Panel Approves $346 Million Highway, PrisonBond Sale,
CAPITAL MARKETS REP., Aug. 29, 1997 (explaining that Edwin Kessler noted that nearly $100 million
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It is noteworthy that the OCIA-issued bonds only provide a portion of the
required funding for the state highway project. Under the two-phase funding
program, the initial $700 million three-year funding phase consists of not only the
bond issue proceeds," but also additional constitutional reserve funds and general

revenue funds.I" The state would undertake the second $300 million contingent
funding phase only if the state economy continued to exhibit substantive growth."°

The legislature created this condition precedent to avoid burdening the state with
massive debt and "jeopardiz[ing] the state's ability to raise bonds in the future

should [it] have to respond to some unforeseen emergency .... "Jos
B. Question for the Court

The primary issue in Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority concerned
whether highway improvement bonds authorized by title 73, section 168.6 of the

Oklahoma Statutes constituted valid obligations or illegal debt under existing
balanced budget amendments, election requirements, and debt limitations of the

Oklahoma Constitution." 6 In determining whether the proposed bonds violated
article 10, section

2 3,"O

section

2 4 ,"O

and section

25

"Oof the Oklahoma

in interest and fees would be paid during the ten-year life of the bonds).
102. Note that general revenues and "Rainy Day" funds are being appropriated not only to retire the
bonds, but also to serve as additional funding for the first funding phase of the transportation program.
103. See Official Statement, supra note 95, at 8; see also Marie Price, Where Did the State's Money
Go?, J. Rac. (Oklahoma City), June 10, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 14394759.
104. See Price, supra note 103; see also Chuck Ervin, Prospects Dim for Road Plan, TULSA
WORLD, May 23, 1997, at A16 (discussing that in order for there to be continued yearly funding there

would have to be a six percent annual growth instate revenue and the Contingency Review Board would
have to unanimously approve it); John Greiner, Panel OKs Prison, Road Bond Issues, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), Aug. 29, 1997, at 1 (stating that the Legislature will spend an additional
$300 million if economic conditions remain good).
105. Marie Price, Legislators Approve Road Program Targeting OKC Tulsa, J. REC. (Oklahoma
City), May 30, 1997, at 11.

106. See In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d 759, 761 (Okla. 1998).
107. See OKLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 23. The section provides in pertinent part that
[t]he state shall never create or authorize the creation of any debt or obligation, or fund
or pay any deficit, against the state, or any department, institution or agency thereof,
regardless of its form, or the source of money from which it is to be paid, except as may
be provided in this section and in sections 24 and 25 of Article X of the Constitution of
the State of Oklahoma ....
Id.
108. See OKLA. CONsT. art. X § 24. The section provides in pertinent part that "[i]n addition to the
above limited power to contract debts, the State may contract debts to repel invasion, suppress
insurrection or to defend the State in war." Id.
109. See OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 25. The section provides in pertinent part that
[e]xcept the debts specified in sections twenty-three and twenty-four of this article, no debts
shall be hereafter contracted by or on behalf of this State, unless such debt shall be
authorized by law for some work or object, to be distinctly specified therein; and such law
shall impose and provide for the collection of a direct annual tax to pay, and sufficient to
pay, the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal of
such debt within twenty-five years from the time of the contracting thereof. No such law
shall take effect until it shall, at a general election, have been submitted to the people and
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Constitution, the court had to resolve four secondary issues. First, the court was
required to detennine the intent of the constitutional debt limitations. Second, the
court was required to interpret whether the bonds were considered debts and legal

obligations of the state or simply moral obligations. Third, if the court decided the
proposed bonds were debts, then the court faced resolving whether the debts fell
within the special fund exception as self-liquidating debt. Finally, the court had to
ascertain whether the multi-year lease obligation required self-liquidation or was
considered a separate exception.
C. Decision of the Court
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the highway improvement bonds issued
pursuant to title 73, section 168.6 of the Oklahoma Statutes were constitutional." '
The court found that unless a statute is shown to be fraught with constitutional
infirmities, the court was bound to interpret the statute so as to avoid constitutional
doubt of the provision's validity."' At no time did the court find that the statute
violated debt prohibitions of the Oklahoma Constitution; thus, it approved the bond
issue."'
The court held that, because the statute in question did not bind future Oklahoma
legislatures to make the anticipated appropriations, the bonds did not create "debt"
within the meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution.' The court found that the full
faith and credit of the state was not pledged, because there was only the prospect,
as opposed to the promise, of future annual appropriations." 4 The statute created
a "moral obligation" for future legislatures to appropriate funds, but not a "legally
enforceable" promise constituting a debt."5
The court further held that even if the bonds could be considered a debt, they are
self-liquidating because a prepaid direct and dedicated tax on fuels and user fees,
such as vehicle licenses, was specifically earmarked by title 73, section 168.6 of the
Oklahoma Statutes to retire the bonds on an annual basis."' The combination of
taxes and fees created a revenue stream directly related to the construction and
maintenance of highways, which is the prerequisite for the revenue stream." 7
The court further reasoned that because multi-year leasing and bond financing rest
upon the same legal foundation, stare decisis mandates the approval of the

have received a majority of all the votes cast for and against it at such election ....
la4
110. See Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d at 761.

111. See idt at 763 (quoting Gilbert Cent. Corp. v. State, 716 P.2d 654, 658 (Okla. 1986)).
112. See generally Gruen v. Tax Comm'n, 211 P.2d 651, 656 (Wash. 1949) ("[A] statute cannot be
judicially declared beyond the power of the legislature to enact unless in conflict with some specific or

definite provision of the constitution.").
113. See Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d at 761.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 775-76.
116. See id. at 764.
117. See id.
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bonds."' Moreover, the court reasoned that its prior decisions would not warrant
the invalidation of the statute even if the debt were not self-liquidating." 9
D. Subsequent History
A petition for rehearing, filed on April 8, 1998, was denied on April 30, 1998.'"
On May 1, 1998, the respondents filed a notice of intent to appeal to the United
States Supreme Court and a motion to stay mandate. Subsequently, on June 23, the
motion to stay the effectiveness of the court's decision was denied.'"' Ultimately,
the respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
which was denied on October 5, 1998."

IV. Analysis
The Oklahoma Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the highway

improvement bond issue on multiple and contradictory grounds. It provided various
alternate rationales to support its argument that the debt limitations were not

violated. The court was hardly unified. One justice concurred by reason of stare
decisis, while three justices concurred specially. Each of the four dissenting justices
not only wrote their own opinions, but also joined with each separate dissenting
justice.

The court disregarded the seventeen-page dissent, which attacked the majority
opinion on the grounds of legislative intent, moral obligations as legal debt, selfliquidating debt, and stare decisis. It ignored scholarly analysis of the "constitutional
infirmities"'" inherent in such a transaction and overlooked the constitutional
prohibitions to contracting debt without a vote of approval from the people,
regardless of whether the debt was of a legal nature or simply a moral
Although the court's deeply split decision was seemingly policyobligation."

based to fulfill the needs of government, its liberal interpretation sounded the death
knell to Oklahoma's constitutional debt limitations and balanced budget provisions."

118. See id. at 773.
119. See id. at 766.
120. See In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 964 P.2d 873, 873 (Okla. 1998); see also In
re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 69 OKLA. BJ. 2886 (Okla. Sept. 5, 1998) (amended order);
Chuck Ervin, Supreme Court Paves Way ForMassive Road Project,TuLsA WORLD, May 1, 1998, at
1,available in 1998 WL 11135804 (discussing the majority and dissenting opinions); John Greiner, No
ObstaclesLeftfor RoadBonds: StateSupreme CourtRefuses Rehearing, DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma
City), May 1, 1998, at 10 (summarizing the opinions of the court and discussing the repercussions of the
denial for rehearing).
121. See Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 964 P.2d at 873.
122. See Fent v. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 525 U.S. 874 (1998); see also John Greiner,
City Couple to Ask Court to Block Road Bond Issue, DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), May 2,

1998, at 6 (discussing the appeal to the United States Supreme Court).
123. Oklahoma CapitolImprovement Auth., 958 P.2d at 779 (5-4 decision) (Opala, J., dissenting).
124. See id
125. See id. at 759 (showing that the 5-4 decision actually consisted of the court's decision, three
special concurrences, and four dissenting opinions); see also Brendan Coffey, Oklahoma Readies $300
Million Bonds With No Real Backing, CAPrrAL MARKETS REP., Apr. 14, 1998 (on file with the
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A. Legislative Intent
In order to interpret properly the constitutional debt limitation provisions of the
Oklahoma Constitution, the court must give effect to the intent of its framers and
of the people who adopted it." The underlying interpretation and construction of
these constitutional provisions was a "pay-as-you-go" notion, followed since
statehood."u In its wisdom, the Oklahoma populace reserved all power to
determine whether debts should be incurred, excepting only those debts rendered
under emergency constitutional provisions." Likewise, the people mandated that
the Oklahoma legislature operate within an annual balanced budget and that multiyear debts and obligations are prohibited unless there exists an antecedent vote of
approval in a general election." The obvious aim of the constitutional and
statutory restrictions of unauthorized contraction of public debt was to protect the
state's fiscal integrity by prohibiting creation of any present indebtedness that would
legally or morally require subsequent governmental appropriations.
However, the majority of the court in Oklahoma CapitalImprovement Authority
concluded that the Oklahoma legislature, not the populace, holds the constitutional
The court erpower' to determine policy for the state highway system.'
roneously reasoned that the Oklahoma legislature, which owes specific duties to the
transportation system, could sidestep any other constitutional fiscal limitations and
concurrently limit the people's reserved legislative power." In this regard, the
court held that the duties of an instrumentality of government take precedence over
a vote of the people.' This holding is in clear violation of article 10, section 25
of the Oklahoma Constitution, which plainly states that "no such law [incurring state
debt] shall take effect, until it shall, at a general election, have been submitted to
the people [for a vote]."'"

Oklahoma Law Review) (discussing the main arguments of the dissenting opinions).
126. See Boswell v. State, 74 P.2d 940, 942 (1937).

127. See hi. at 945.
128. See id.
129. See OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 25; Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d at 778
dissenting).
(Lavender, J.,

130. See OKLA.CONST. art. XVI, § 1(providing inpertinent part that "[t]he Legislature is directed
to establish a Department of Highways, and shall have the power to .. .provide for building and

maintaining public roads . ..").
131. See Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d at 776 (explaining that article 16, section
1 and article 21, section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution "reflect the conviction of the framers of the

Constitution that the Legislature has more specific responsibilities with respect to the state's transportation
and the fashioning of institutional structures for enhancing it").
132. See Anschutz Corp. v. Sanders, 734 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Okla. 1987) (explaining that the court
may not, through the use of statutory construction, change, modify, or amend the expressed intent of the

Legislature); Witzenburger v. Wyoming Community Dev. Auth., 575 P.2d 1100, 1124 (Wyo. 1978) ("A
state constitution is not a grant but a limitation on legislative power, so that the legislature may enact
any law not expressly or inferentially prohibited by the Constitution of the State.").
133. But see H.RJ. Res. 1037, 33rd Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Okla. 1972) (showing that although the

current bond issue was not allowed a statewide vote, a very similar $250 million bond issue was
disapproved by voters on March 7, 1972).
134. See OKLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 25.
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The court strained to find any viable interpretation of the statute that it could
remotely find constitutional.35 Once the court found a possible legal construction,
it dismissed arguments to the contrary as simply controversy concerning the
desirability or practicability of a "modern method of financing."" In Oklahoma
Capitol Improvement Authority, the court fails to follow its own guidance
concerning the "plainly manifested purpose [and intent]" of the people who adopted
article 10, section 23 of the Oklahoma Constitution."
In this case, the court's analysis was insufficient. Although the court may have
followed the letter of the law, it also should have considered the spirit and purpose
of the law." The court should not obscure the intent of debt limits and instead
construe the debt prohibition clause with regard to its purpose of safeguarding the
taxpayers from the excesses and mismanagement of the government.'39 Taken as
a whole, the constitutional debt limitation provisions could not be "couched in
clearer or more comprehensive terms."'" In fact, the language is as inclusive and
comprehensive as human ingenuity could contrive. By disregarding the spirit and
purpose of the constitutional debt prohibition clause, the court avoided the injunction
to deficit spending through linguistic jugglery and imperiled the future financial
security of the state.
B. Legal Obligations v. Moral Obligations

The definition of a "debt" is not clear from Oklahoma statutory language or prior
case law. The Oklahoma Constitution refers to prohibiting "a debt to be
contracted."' However, to hold that contracting a debt undeniably relates to "a
legally enforceable obligation" is to restrict unnaturally the general syntax of the
word." The general object and purpose of the constitutional debt limitations
requires that the word "debt" be given its literal, natural, and full meaning. In

135. See Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d at 763 (quoting Gilbert Cent. Corp. v.

State, 716 P.2d 654, 658 (Okla. 1986) ("If there are two possible interpretations - one of which would
hold the statute unconstitutional, the construction must be applied which renders it constitutional."))).
136. Id.
137. Smith v. State Bd. of Equalization, 630 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Okla. 1981).
138. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 221 (1986) ("In expounding a statute,
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy." (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. 113, 122
(1849))).
139. See id.
140. Boardman Co. v. Board of Comm'rs of Ellis County, 276 P. 474, 477 (Okla. 1929).
141. OKLA. CONsT. art. X, §§ 24, 25.
142. See In re Strauss, 197 U.S. 324,330 (1905) (stating that words in a constitution "do not receive
a narrow contracted meaning, but are presumed to have been used in a broad sense, with a view of
covering all contingencies"); see also In re Estates of Donnelly v. Iverson, 502 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wash.
1973) ("[Wlhere the literal interpretation of a particular word is repugnant to the intent of the legislature
plainly manifested by the legislation taken as a whole, such interpretation ought not to prevail.").
143. See Lewis v. Carpenter, 100 N.E.2d 874, 877 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950) ("[W]ords of a statute...
will be construed in their ordinary acceptation and significance and with the meaning commonly
attributed to them ...and they are to be given their natural, literal, and full meaning ....
").
But see
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
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some contexts, contracting a debt means simply making an agreement to borrow
money.'" Elsewhere, debt is defined as a "sum of money due by certain and
express agreement ... including not only obligation of debtor to pay but right of
creditor to receive. "" In the past, even the Oklahoma Supreme Court had held
that it is not their perogative "to distort plain language of statute in order that a
more plausible or workable result might be obtained."'" Most importantly, though,
the Oklahoma legislature has made clear that all statutory language is "to be
understood in [its] ordinary sense.""Pursuant to the majority's rationale in Oklahoma Capitol ImprovementAuthority,
the state does not create a legally binding obligation against itself because it
statutorily disavowed the creation of any such debt in the issuance of bonds by
inserting certain "magic language."'" By simply noting that "the bonds... shall
not be deemed to constitute a debt of the state or a pledge of the faith and credit of

the state," the legislature attempts to eliminate any argument to the contrary."9
This reducto ad absurdum results in the state being able to refute legal obligations
with a stroke of a pen. The Oklahoma Supreme Court accepted this fallacy on its
face, even though it earlier held in Boswell that the determination whether a debt

is contrary to constitutional debt limitations is a judicial and not a legislative
question." ° Certainly, the very use of the term "bonds" manifestly interweaves

with the idea of obligations, indebtedness, and liabilities.'
Because the current bond issue was a multi-year obligation and the full faith and

credit of the state was not pledged, future Oklahoma legislative assemblies were not
legally obligated to provide funding to retire the bonds.'

Notwithstanding the

state's moral obligation to continue funding the revenue-raising project, supported
by statutory language stating the legislature's intent to maintain funding,'" the

Statutes Are to Be Construed,3 VANe. L. REv. 395, 401 (1950) (explaining that there are two opposing
canons on almost every point).
144. See 15 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1, 2 (1991) (stating that a contract is defined as an agreement to do
or not to do a certain thing); see also Troy v. Yelle, 217 P.2d 337 (Wash. 1950) (viewing constitutional
debt as money borrowed).
145. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 403 (6th ed. 1991).

146. Whittier v. Murrell, 362 P.2d 694 (1961).
147. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1 (Supp. 1997); see also State ex reL Western State Hosp. v. Stoner, 614
P.2d 59 (1980) (explaining that the ordinary and common definitions of words are appropriate to
determine proper construction).
148. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d at 795 (5-4 decision) (Watt, J., dissenting).
149. 73 OKLA. STAT. § 168.6() (Supp. 1997).
150. See Boswell v. State, 74 P.2d 940, 943 (1937).
151. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 178 (6th ed, 1991) (defining a bond as "a certificate or
evidence of a debt on which the issuing... governmental body promises to pay the bondholders a
specified amount of interest for a specified length of time, and to repay the loan on the expiration date").

152. See Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d at 771 ("[A]ny payment the bond
purchasers receive will hinge on the independent decision of future legislatures to make the anticipated
appropriations.'); see also In re Petition of Univ. Hosps. Auth., 953 P.2d 314, 328 (Okla. 1998)
(explaining that one legislature cannot bind another to the fiscal affairs of the state beyond its biennium).
153. See 73 OKLA. STAT. § 168.6(H) (Supp. 1997) ("It is the intent of the Oklahoma Legislature
to maintain the funding level of the State Transportation Fund as required in order for the Department
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court held that the pledge did not rise to the level of a legal commitment."4 Even
so, to default on payment would devastate the state's credit-worthiness and would
greatly hinder its ability to borrow money for any future capital project.' The
economic reality is that Oklahoma would not dare avoid its obligation for fear of
damaging its reputation and its ability to borrow on credit." Financial institutions
and bondholders fully comprehend and exploit this governmental responsibility. It
follows, then, that the state government could not market the revenue bonds to the
public if there was not an effective implicit commitment of the state's general taxing
power. Although revenue bonds and general obligation bonds are not equivalent, the
distinctions are blurred when applied in the manner of the highway improvement
bond issue.
According to the court, the state had no legal obligation to repay bondholders,
even though the bondholders had conferred a benefit upon the people of Oklahoma
by providing the funding for the highway improvement project."' Alternatively,
the state was obligated to repay the bonds and interest on an equitable basis, if not
a legal one."
Other authorities disagree that a moral and equitable obligation does not reach a
legal imperative. According to the Ruling Case Law of 1919, indebtedness, within
the meaning of constitutional debt limitations, can arise when there is an equitable
or moral obligation to pay a financial obligation to a creditor who has a moral right
to constrain the debtor to pay.' Even recently, courts have supported this notion.
For example, contrary to Oklahoma's ruling, the Wyoming Supreme Court held in
1978:
The essence of a moral obligation ... appeals to a universal sense of

justice and fairness, even though upon such facts no legally enforceable
claim can be based. A "moral obligation" justifying the enactment of a
state providing for the payment of compensation in a case in which no
legal liability exists on the part of the state is such an obligation as
would be recognized by men ... with a real desire to act fairly and
equitably without compulsion of law. . . . It is an obligation which,

of Transportation to fully pay any and all obligations incurred.").

154. See Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d at 768. But see City of Ottumwa, Iowa
v. City Water Supply Co., 119 F. 315, 327 (8th Cir. 1902) ("[A] promise to pay a certain amount, with
interest, within a fixed time, out of taxes taken from all the people, including those not benefitted, would
seem to most people to be a debt.").
155. See Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d at 779 (5-4 decision) (Lavendar, J.,
dissenting).

156. See id at 794 (Watt, J., dissenting).
157. But see Hogland v. Merrick County, 115 N.W. 537, 537 (Neb. 1908) ("A bona fide debt is one
that is owing to another, one that could be enforced in a court of justice.").
158. See Oklahoma Capitol ImprovementAuth., 958 P.2d at 793 (5-4 decision) (Watt, J., dissenting).
159. See generally 19 RULING CASE LAw § 276, at 979 (William M. McKinney et al. eds., 1917)
(Municipal Corporations) (explaining indebtedness as arising upon a legal or moral contract whether
express or implied).
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though lacking any foundation cognizable in law, springs from a sense
of justice and equity ....

"

Therefore, the Oklahoma legislature cannot fail to honor its obligation, despite
disclaimers to the contrary, when its tacit commitment is tantamount to an express
commitment.
When the state "puts itself into such a position that it will forfeit large sums,
which it has already expended unless it makes an additional payment, it is indebted
in the constitutional sense..' 6 A valid enforceable obligation exists by virtue of

the benefit conferred upon the state, and the fact that an equitable remedy could be
available." The court cannot avoid the equitable issue of the moral obligation by

narrowly defining the word "debt."'"

However, this narrow and formalistic

definition of debt invites circumvention of constitutional provisions."
Moreover, the state incurs a debt through its own instrumentality, the OCIA'
In the event of payment default, the MBIA pays the bondholder the principal and

then becomes the owner of the principal.

The insurance company could then sue

the primary obligor, in this case, the OCIA 67 Because the Authority's liability is

directly related to the legislature's appropriated funds, the state would assume
responsibility for the debt."

160. Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community Dev. Auth., 575 P.2d 1100, 1129 (Wyo.
1978) (quoting 63 AM. JUR 2D Public Funds § 70).
161. Id.
162. See W.K. Warren v. Century Bankcorp., Inc., 741 P.2d 846, 852 (Okla. 1987) (explaining the
concept of restitution damages and the use of constructive trusts for unjust enrichment).
163. See also City of Lawton v. Morford, 293 P. 1068, 1071 (Okla. 1930) ("To say the transaction
does not create a debt is to play with words and deceive oneself in failure to use ordinary understanding
while straining at expressions contained in decisions illy considered or not bearing upon the point").
164. See Seto, supra note 45, at 1490 (discussing the problems associated with formally defining
debt instruments).
165. See 73 OKLA. STAr. § 152 (Supp. 1997) (providing in pertinent part that the Authority is an
"instrumentality of the state" and that the exercise of its powers are "deemed and shall be held to be an
essential governmental function of the state').
166. See MBIA Financial Guaranty Insurance Policy, Appendix F, Official Statement of the Okla.
Capitol Improvement Auth., State Highway Capital Improvement Revenue Bonds, Series 1998 (on file
with the Oklahoma Law Review); see also Dow Jones & Company, Inc., CAPrrAL MARKErS REP., July
8, 1998 (stating that the MBIA insured the bonds).
167. See 73 OKLA. STAT. § 152 (Supp. 1997) (providing in pertinent part that the Authority "may
sue and be sued"); see also Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., Resolution § 8 (Sept. 23, 1997) ("The
Authority covenants and agrees ... that it will promptly pay the principal of and interest on every Bond
issued under the provisions of this Bond Resolution... [and that] [the revenues are hereby pledged to
the payment of the Bonds .... "); Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., Resolution § 18(h) (Sept. 23,
1997) ("All such agreements and covenants entered into by the Authority shall be binding in all respects
upon the Authority ... and all such agreements and covenants shall be enforceable by appropriate action
or suit at law or in equity, which may be brought by any holder or holder of Bonds issued hereunder.");
In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d 759, 775 (Okla. 1998) (explaining that the
Authority could only be sued for the money transferred from the ODOT to the OCIA).
168. See John Greiner, Road Program Moves Forward,DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 20, 1997, at 6
("'mthe intent of the legislature' was to permit the issuance of bonds generally known as leaseappropriation bonds, which are dependent on subsequent appropriations to retire the bonds.").
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Debt should have only one meaning in regard to constitutional debt limitations.
Such a definition must be concrete and well established. To leave ambiguity in such
a consequential area and to construct creative definitions in order to fit the situation
ignores reality. It is questionable whether courts, in their desire for legal expedience, should "make words mean so many different things"" and in doing so
perform as interpreting funambulists.
C. Self-liquidation
After painstakingly explaining why the bond issue did not even remotely
represent a legal debt, the Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority court further
explained why the "self-liquidating debt exception" should apply to the "non-debt."
The self-liquidating exception, also known as the "restricted special fund" exception,
would only be relevant if the capital improvement created a multi-year legal debt
that is retired solely from revenues generated from the project itself, but was not
incurred by the people at the voting polls.' The Oklahoma Supreme Court has
continually upheld this well-delineated immunity from constitutional debt
limitations.' In the case at bar, the court takes the view that the blend of
vehicular user fees and fuel taxes creates a revenue stream associated with the
construction and maintenance of highways, and the highways generate the revenue
and are thus somehow self-liquidating." In using the self-liquidation argument,
the court invalidates its previous contention that the obligation is not a legal debt..
As opposed to toll roads, office buildings, education facilities, and dormitories,
public roads cannot be leased, rented, or used as collateral for repayment of the
defaulted investment. The capital project cannot create a new "cash flow" by itself
from only the users of the highways."r Instead, the obligation must solely rest on

169. THE-COMPLET WoRKs OF LEWIS CARROLL 214 (Modem Library ed. 1936) ("'When I use a

word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just what I chose it to mean - neither
more nor less.' 'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different
things.'").
170. See Oklahoma CapitolImprovementAuth., 958 P.2d at 780 (Okla. 1998) (Opala, J., dissenting).
In order for there to be a self-liquidating obligation, four basic criteria must be met. First,

all proceeds from the sale of bonds must go toward a defined project. Second, the project
must generate funds dedicated solely toward retirement of the bonded indebtedness. Third,
the funds must be created by the terms of the obligation, and not from preexisting
revenue. Finally, the stream generated by project funds must be placed beyond legislative

control and dedicated to the retirement of bonds.
Id.
171. See In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 410 P.2d 46 (Okla. 1966); In re Oklahoma
Capitol Improvement Auth. 355 P.2d 1028 (Okla. 1960) (office buildings to be retired by rental
payments); In re Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 221 P.2d 795 (Okla. 1950) (toll roads to be retired from
tolls); In re Board of Regents for Okla. Agric. & Mechanical Colleges, 167 P.2d 883 (Okla. 1946); Board

of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 161 P.2d 447 (Okla. 1945); (governmental building bonds to be retired
from rental payments); Baker v. Carter, 25 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1933) (dormitory bonds to be retired by
student rent).

172. See Oklahoma CapitolImprovement Auth., 958 P.2d at 764.
173. Brief for Respondents at 11, Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d 759 (Okla. 1998)
(No. 90,101).
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continued general revenues from all Oklahoma taxpayers. The state did not design
the self-liquidating fund exception to apply to obligations that were liquidated or
retired by an infusion of funds from general revenues."
Correspondingly,
"revenue bonds" by definition require that the "payments be generated by the project
supported by the proceeds from the bonds issued."'7 "Revenue bonds" are retired
from revenues derived from operation of a public project and paid by the users of
that facility, rather than so-called "revenue" from state taxes."" Because the
OCIA-created revenue bonds lack the power of self-liquidating annual amortization,
they could be more aptly called "tax bonds." However, to use this more appropriate
term for the obligations in question would obviously degrade the argument that they
are not legal debts and violative of the Constitution.
As in Boswell, the special fund is created from specific user fees and taxes, which
compose a part of the general revenue of the state that would otherwise be devoted
to other public interests." The court in Boswell specifically rejected this type of
financing. Although six decades have passed since this landmark decision, it has
never specifically been overruled and thus is still good law. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court should reaffirm its own denial of the Oklahoma legislature's attempt
to divert pledged tax revenues that were a "part of the general revenues of the
state."'" As in Boswell, the court should recognize that, "it is entirely immaterial
whether one or another part of the [state] revenue is drawn upon so long as that
revenue could be available for any public purpose which the Legislature may
designate."'" The Oklahoma Supreme Court only has to follow the money to
ensure that it doesn't violate its own rule."
The Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority court actually goes farther than
mistakenly employing the restricted special fund exception to the bond issue; it
implicitly revives the "expanded special fund doctrine" that it previously struck
down in Boswell.' In Boswell, the court held that if a property already exists and
is extended, improved, or otherwise augmented, the state cannot use future income

174. See In re Oklahoma Educ. Television Auth., 272 P.2d 1027, 1035 (Okla. 1954) (stating that
the rejected bonds were to be repaid solely from funds accruing to existing permanent funds of the State);
see also Marie Price, Common Cause Seeks Bond Issue Rehearing, J. REC. (Oklahoma City), Apr. 9,

1998, at 3, available in 1998 WL 11959301 ("Since the bond proceeds are to be used for something in
which the issuer has no interest at all, there can be no legal distinction between this and the financing
of a state budget shortfall.").
175. BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 124 (6th ed. 1991).
176. See Alan v. County of Wayne, 200 N.W.2d 628, 699 (Mich. 1972) (explaining that under
Michigan's Revenue Bond Act, self-liquidating revenues are not the same as general tax revenues in
regard to revenue bonds).

177. See Boswell v. State, 74 P.2d 940, 944 (Okla. 1937).
178. I

179. ld
180. See BARBARA SEBERDICK FEINBURG, WATERGATE: SCANDAL INTHE WHrE HousE29 (1990)
(explaining the well-known journalistic phrase, "follow the money," made famous by "Deep Throat," a

crucial informant during the Watergate conspiracy).
181. In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d 759, 787 (Okla. 1998) (Wilson, J.,
dissenting).
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from that property to retire the obligations.l" In this case, the vast majority of the
highways already exist and are merely being improved; thus, self-liquidation should
be deemed inappropriate."
The Boswell court cautioned future courts not to let ignorance lead them to an
unjustified extension of the restricted "special fund" exception to the constitutional
debt limitations."M Unfortunately, courts have not heeded the warnings of Boswell
that the difference between special funds and the "special fund doctrine" could
become obfuscated. Due to the court's inability to distinguish between a fiscal
principle and legislative financing capital, the special fund and lease-agreement
exceptions are rendered purposeless. The "new and improved" law exchanges those
cumbersome exceptions with a carte blanche approach to financing long-term debt
through creatively diverting annual legislative appropriations.
D. Precedentand Stare Decisis
The court cites years of precedent and stare decisis as justification for its decision
in Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority." The justices contend that the
government and its people are entitled to predictability, and holding a multi-year
leasing agreement unconstitutional would "reduce certainty and progress with legal
chaos" and bring state government financing to a "standstill."'" The court fails to
distinguish between multi-year property leases and a transaction to build and
improve public highways. Instead, the court claims that the two rest upon the same
legal basis. The current highway improvement bond issue cannot even be
considered a classic installment lease agreement because the governmental program
not only builds what are fundamentally public roads, but also repairs public roads
already in existence.' The previously mentioned lease agreement cases are easily
distinguished from the present case by the vital fact that the leased property in those
cases was not property designed for public use. The property in those cases was
tangible property capable of serving as collateral for the existing debt.u
Although the court has approved self-liquidating projects in the past, the proposed
bond issue can be distinguished from those previously validated by the court. In the
present case, because the issuance of bonds creates no invested funds that will be
used to purchase property that, in turn, will generate funds to retire the bonds, the

182. See Boswell, 74 P.2d at 947.
183. See Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d at 773.
184. Boswell, 74 P.2d at 950.
185. Accord In re Petition of Univ. Hosps. Auth., 953 P.2d 314 (Okla. 1998); Indiana Nat'l Bank
v. State Dep't of Human Servs., 857 P.2d 53 (Okla. 1993); U.C. Leasing, Inc. v. State ex rel State Bd.
of Public Affairs, 737 P.2d 1191 (Okla. 1987); Halstead v. McHendry, 566 P.2d 134 (Okla. 1977);
Boswell v. State, 74 P.2d 940 (Okla. 1937) (providing cases that support the court's holdings).
186. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d at 773.
187. See Description of Highway Projects, Appendix D, Official Statement of the Okla. Capitol
Improvement Auth., State Highway Capital Improvement Revenue Bonds, Series 1998 (on file with the
Oklahoma Law Review).
188. Cf In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 355 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Okla. 1960) ('Tlhe lease
form adopted by the Authority provides for an indeterminate term with rental fixed on a monthly basis
with provision for revision in amount to provide funds to retire the bonds.").
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bonds are not self-liquidating.n Instead, the money is earmarked to improve and
construct roads that are dedicated to the public use without means of recovering the
principal except for future general revenue appropriations.
Justifying its decision using a comprehensive approach of alternative reasoning,
the court further finds that even if the highway proposal were not self-liquidating,
preceding Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions would not justify its invalidation.'"
The court draws a fallacious correlation between multi-year lease agreements that
were not self-liquidating and the highway improvement bond issue. 9' Because the
court previously found the lease agreements in U.C. Leasing, Inc. v. State ex rel.
State Board of Public Affairs"g and Indiana National Bank v. State Department
of Human Services'93 constitutional, the lack of self-liquidation in regard to longterm lease agreements is not controlling. ' Although both bonds and leases are
financial obligations, the similarity ends there. In 1960, the Oklahoma Capitol
Improvement Authority court distinguished between contracts for long-term debts
created by bonds and long-term obligations by leases.' 5 In essence, the court
made a specific exception for future installments related to future services in a
leasing arrangement.
V. Impact of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority
on State ConstitutionalLaw
Due to the court's insistence that Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority
simply illustrates a "modem method of financing" supported by "innovative legal
measures," the legislature may incur additional deficit spending that may reach
beyond the fiscal year indiscriminately without an antecedent vote of approval by
the electorate." After years of decisions that diluted the power and ignored the
intent of debt limitations, the court finally allowed the exception to swallow the
constitutional rule. The court presumed that the framers of the Oklahoma
Constitution could not have foreseen, but would have approved, a contemporary and
complex financing system in which borrowing money does not necessitate
repayment.'" The court suggests that those who conceived the debt limitation
clause only intended a constitutionally preserved right to control deficit spending
when a legal loophole could not be found.
The court permitted the urgency of the situation and the insistence of the
legislative and executive branches to override the constitutional safeguard against
improvidence and the destruction of Oklahoma's economic integrity.' The effect

189. See Oklahoma CapitolImprovement Auth., 958 P.2d at 764.

190. See iU. at 766.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See if.
737 P.2d 1191 (Okla. 1987).
857 P.2d 53 (Okla. 1993).
See Oklahoma CapitolImprovement Auth., 958 P.2d at 766-67.

195. See Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 355 P.2d at 1033.
196. See Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d at 763.

197. See id. at 771.
198. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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of the decision is the constructive repeal of article 10, section 25 of the Oklahoma
Constitution as well as the gutting of balanced budget amendments. Future
legislatures that utilize the court's rationale may avoid creating a legally binding
obligation against itself by simply repudiating the creation of state debt while
diverting tax revenue from other sources. Additionally, by implicitly adopting the
"expanded special fund" exception and permitting the improved highways to
generate motor fuel taxes that will be future net income of the property improved,
the court overruled itself and created new law. Appropriation-risk bonds, or "moral
obligation bonds" as they are more commonly known, will likely become the future
Oklahoma standard of governmental financing. There will be no legal impediment
to large-scale deficit financing of capital projects, because the court here removed
the obstacle of debt limitations.
In the end, the impact of the precedent set in Oklahoma will resound nationwide.
As techniques of circumvention materialize and gain approval, they often spread to
other states' courts. Thus, there is every reason to believe that other states will adopt
the same logic to place the final nail in the coffin of their respective state
constitutional debt limitations. Just as the Oklahoma Supreme Court utilized other
states' opinions as authority for their tenuous arguments, other states may use this
decision for a similar purpose. This continual borrowing of legal authority among
the states may inevitably cause the final demise of constitutional debt limitations
across the nation.
VI. Conclusion
In accordance with the Oklahoma constitutional debt prohibitions, a bond issue
must be submitted to the electorate for approval at a general election. The state
question should provide for a direct annual tax sufficient to pay the principal and
interest on the debt. Without a vote of the people, the highway improvement bond
issue in question creates a legally binding and unconstitutional debt, violating the
debt limitations of the Oklahoma Constitution.
Although the purpose of highway improvement is meritorious,' unconstitutional
bond financing is inexcusable. Courts cannot sustain the unconstitutional application
of this, or any other statute, simply because of the importance of the ends to be
furthered. ° To find the bond issue unconstitutional is not to sentence the state to
a second-class transportation system; it merely forces the legislature to follow the
law as written. As long as the debt prohibition clauses remain in the Constitution
unamended or unrepealed, all branches of state government have the responsibility
to follow the letter and intent of the law and not to attempt to circumvent the law
of the land when it is expedient to do so. The Oklahoma Constitutioh is the

199. See Brief for Applicant at 7, In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d 759 (Okla.
1998).
200. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 58 (1998) ("[A constitution] is the mandate of a

sovereign people to its servants and representatives, and no one of them has a right to ignore or disregard

its mandates; the legislature, the executive officers, and the judiciary cannot lawfully act beyond its

limitations.").
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inflexible will of the people that should not be subject to the changing tides of
public opinion and desires, except by proper constitutional amendments.
It is time to put a firm cap on debt limitation escape devices. In the past,
Oklahoma, like most states, liberalized its interpretation of debt prohibition to ease
the way for governmental progress. As a result, the essence of the debt
constitutional prohibitions deteriorated, leaving only a shadow of its former self.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court had the opportunity to revive and strengthen the
constitutional safeguards that promote fiscal responsibility and an empowered
populace. However, when the court came to the fork in the road, it decided to take
the road well traveled and constructively repeal any meaningful constitutional debt
limitations. Would the framers of the original constitutional debt limitations have
approved of this result, or would they believe Oklahoma citizens had been robbed
of their constitutional rights?
Brian Edward Wheeler
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